It is widely acknowledged that there has been an increased threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). Recent events have made it clear that CBWs pose a potential threat not only on the battlefield, but also as agents of terrorism. The agents under consideration range from low molecular weight compounds such as organophosphorus nerve agents to invasive cells and viruses. In addition, many of these agents are already established public health problems. See, e.g. Paddle B M. 2003. Therapy and prophylaxis of inhaled biological toxins. Journal of Applied Toxicology 23: 139-70, which is incorporated herein by reference.
Accordingly, detection of CBW agents is a continuing and accelerating intelligence challenge. Detection of CBW agents is an exceptionally demanding problem because the amounts of CBW agent sufficient to cause harm to humans is typically very small, requiring exceptional sensitivity. Moreover, rapid identification and remediation is frequently necessary. Even more worrisome, with advances in biological synthesis capabilities, creation of new CBW agents is no longer exclusively a nation-state enterprise with large-scales observables, but is becoming a garage enterprise—on the scale of methamphetamine labs—with widespread availability to potential adversaries.
Most current threat detection systems utilize immunology, PCR, or spectroscopic detection-based technologies which rely on precise identification of the biological or chemical toxin involved. While this approach has its uses, it is ineffective against either newly developed or modified threats that, by novelty or design, can evade precise recognition elements.
Accordingly, there is a need for widely dispersible, inexpensive sensors that are able to monitor large areas for a wide variety of both known and unknown agents. Accordingly, a chip-scale technology that is sensitive to a variety of agent classes and that requires only very small sample volumes is needed.
Accordingly, in one embodiment, the present disclosure provides a microscale, multi-threat agent detection system that is able to detect both known and unknown agents by detection of physiological responses associated with exposure to a toxic agent, rather than the presence of specific toxins. In this strategy, the potential physiological effect is key, and the exact identify of the threat agent is secondary. Detection of physiological responses allows for rapid intervention and/or prophylaxis to block mortality and morbidity among potential target populations. Because the detector exploits the target of the threat, or one of the targets of the threat, either novel threats, or those deliberately designed to thwart current detections schemes, are quickly detected.
Moreover, at least in some embodiments, the system described herein, allows at least low level quantification of the ability of the threat to bind to the target physiological molecule, thus allowing for proper (or at least improved estimates of the proper) dosage of counter acting agents.
It will be appreciated that the need for such systems is apparent for a variety of applications, not limited to simply detection of CBW agents, but also including intelligence gathering, battlefield readiness, general public health, and both clinical and basic research. Accordingly, in at least some embodiments, the system described herein is envisioned as an important component for future medical diagnostic and drug discovery applications, as well as being a possible means of rapid and efficient proteomic analysis.